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Review

PRIF Review 2024The Rise of the Far Right in Germany

Highly Commended Book Publication

The Rise of the Far Right in Germany

Red tiled wall with various graffiti.

Photo: Daniel Mullis

Why are right-wing and far-right movements successful in times of crisis? Daniel Mullis explores this question in his book “The Rise of the Right in Times of Crisis” – and seeks an explanation not in the far right, but within the much-vaunted center of society: After all, it is not a marginal phenomenon when the AfD wins 20 percent of the vote in the federal elections. In this interview, he discusses his research process and describes the dynamics that make reactionary attitudes and right-wing ideologies resonatewithin the center of society.

Daniel Mullis

Dr. Daniel Mullis is a Senior Researcher at PRIF’s Research Department Glocal Junctions and Chair of of Research Council. He works on social conflicts, spatial inequality and, in particular, the rise of the far right. He also investigates neoliberalization processes and urban development.

  1. Your book “The Rise of the Right in Times of Crisis. The Regression of the Center” was published by Reclam in March 2024. It was positively reviewed by the Federal Agency for Civic Education and republished in the fall of 2024. What is your book about?

    The book is the result of my research project “Everyday Political Subjectification and the Rise of Regressive Politics. Downward Mobility, Urbanization and the Production of Space in Frankfurt am Main and Leipzig”, which was funded by the German Research Foundation. In the book, I explore the role that social developments in recent years – such as the financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, the climate crisis, and the debate on migration – have played in the rise of the extreme right in Germany.

    „If the AfD gets 35 to 40 percent of the vote in some places, then we have to accept that these are processes that are taking place in the center of society.“

    In the first part of the book, I present these social developments, mobilization, and debates of recent years. For the second part – the empirical core of the book – I conducted interviews with my colleague Paul Zschocke in Frankfurt am Main and Leipzig, in districts where the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party has a relatively strong presence. We looked at the social environment, existing problems, everyday experiences, but also expectations of happiness. In the third part, I looked at fundamental social processes such as individualization, competition, and the effects of neoliberal competition.

  2. In your book you argue that it is important to change the perspective. You suggest that instead of looking from the extreme right toward the center of society, we should examine the processes within the center itself that enable the extreme right to gain such traction there. You then speak of the “regression of the center.” What exactly do you mean by that?

    If we want to understand the rise of the far right, it is not enough to look at the supposed fringes and pretend that we are dealing with a marginal phenomenon. If the AfD gets 35 to 40 percent of the vote in some places, then we have to accept that these are processes that are taking place in the center of society.

    That is why I investigated what exactly is happening within the in this center. My research shows how people in this country create identities and how they deal with democracy. You could also say how society understands itself. I argue that the crisis-ridden developments of recent years have made people aware that their hopes for the future are no longer guaranteed per se. They know that the promise of prosperity is no longer valid – the keyword here is “relegation society.”

    They are also experiencing the consequences of the climate crisis and are aware that the world is precarious in the face of wars and conflicts. The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is of great significance here. Hence people have a very clear understanding that we are living in times of upheaval.

    My research shows that tension, insecurity and frustration are very widespread in society. This If the AfD gets 35 to 40 percent of the vote in some places, then we have to accept that these are processes that are taking place in the center of society. This leads to processes of social closure: People are starting to deny participation to others. They want to hold on to their own privileges, even if it means excluding others. We are seeing processes of closure on a broad front that challenge the basic principles of democracy, participation, and the common struggle over issues. My phrase “regression of the center” refers precisely to this reaction to crisis phenomena, which is also due in no small part to the lack of political alternatives. It can also be observed that these processes of closure are linked to established individualistic notions of competition and rivalry.

    In this charged atmosphere, there is a growing willingness to exclude less affluent people but also migrants from participation and entitlement to social security. This is as much about closures of identity as it is about physical border closures. An important aspect of this is the return to traditional concepts of gender, which goes hand in hand with attacks on queer identities and non-binary lifestyles, but also reinforces traditional roles to women.

  3. What I found particularly remarkable was your finding that the people you interviewed rarely have a coherent right-wing extremist worldview. Instead, their political identities are made up of fragments. Can you explain what this means for the political landscape in Germany?

    It is striking that the demarcation processes mentioned above do not follow clearly defined lines. In virtually all interviews, xenophobic and racist attitudes were expressed to varying degrees. Although overt racism is not present everywhere, there is a general willingness to blame migrants for social ills and to assign them places at the bottom of the social hierarchy.

    „My research shows that right-wing extremist parties are gaining strength precisely because they can rely on popularity in the gray area. That is why it is not enough to look at the supposed fringes of society.“

    In the interviews, for example, migrants were blamed for having too many cars in the neighboorhood, for dumping bulky waste in the wrong places, or for being too loud at night. To give a concrete example: An elderly couple with rather conservative attitudes are involved in helping refugees. They believe that Germany needs immigration and that the people who come here are often well educated. However, they see their place in low-income jobs such as nursing and carrying luggage. They also look critically at their neighbor, a doctor who has immigrated to Germany, and judge her according to the motto “she doesn’t quite fit in with us”.

    Quantitative surveys of public opinion and attitudes, such as the recent Mitte study, conclude that about eight percent of people in Germany are manifestly right-wing extremists, and perhaps another 20 percent are in a gray area with rightwing extremist tendencies. These are dramatic numbers. My research shows that right-wing extremist parties are gaining strength precisely because they can rely on popularity in the gray area. That is why it is not enough to look at the supposed fringes of society.

  4. More specifically, how do these attitudes become accessible to the far right?

    is important to understand that the sharp increase in electoral support for extreme right-wing parties does not mean that people are all manifestly exhibiting extreme right-wing attitudes. However, they trust the far right much more than other parties in certain areas that may be relevant to their voting decisions. Migration is not the only issue on which the AfD scores highly, but it is one of its central themes. When people constantly talk about migration in politics, they are constantly pouring water on the far right’s mill and giving them the opportunity to further raise their profile.

    „Post-election polls show that the AfD is increasingly gaining support across various sectors and is perceived as competent. This marks the beginning of a broader normalization process.“

    The intensification of the rhetoric on migration in the run-up to the 2025 federal elections has not brought any additional votes to the bourgeois democratic parties. It has only led to an attitude of “oh, look, without the AfD the other parties wouldn’t react – it’s lucky they exist” and a growing willingness to vote for this party. This does not mean that voters feel completely represented by the party – parts of which are classified as right-wing extremist by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. To vote for the AfD, it is often enough for these voters to identify with certain aspects of the party and believe it is doing the right thing. Over time, far-right attitudes become normalized among them. Post-election polls show that the AfD is increasingly gaining support across various sectors and is perceived as competent. This marks the beginning of a broader normalization process.

  5. Could you explain in more detail how you wentabout your research?

    With pleasure. Together with my colleague Paul Zschocke, I conducted guided interviews in two districts in Frankfurt am Main and one in Leipzig. We chose districts where the AfD is relatively strong, with “strong” meaning different proportions of the vote in each case. We started by talking to people about how they feel in their neighborhoods, what their experiences and aspirations are, and how they perceive politics.

    This resulted in about fifty qualitative interviews, which we analyzed and discussed intensivelywith colleagues in workshops. During the analysis it became clear that the experiences of crisis and racist resentment were not very pronounced among all the interviewees, but they were present in different ways in all the interviews. Therefore, it cannot be said that the link between the experience of crisis and racism takes place beyond the social center, but rather that this process affects society as a whole.

  6. Since the publication of the book, you have given many readings and interviews. Together with the Institute for Social Research, the Kassel Institute for Sustainability, the Open House of Cultures and the AStA of the Goethe University, you organized the conference “Extreme Right in Hesse: Analysis and Counter-Strategies” in Frankfurt am Main. Why did you do it? And how?

    Yes, it is very important to me to have an impact on civil society through research. Our conference, which was sponsored by the German Research Foundation, the City of Frankfurt, and the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, had the explicit goal of creating an interface between academia and civil society, and of reaching out to people who are engaged in the fight against the far right. We were able to discuss the rise of the far right in Hesse with local political activists and NGO staff.

    In Hesse, the AfD received 18.4 percent of the vote in the 2023 state elections – a result that was repeated in the 2025 federal elections. The terrorist organization “National Socialist Underground” had strong structures in Hesse. Rightwing violence has occurred repeatedly in this state, as the attack in Hanau in 2020 showed. For this reason, we wanted to create a venue for the conference that offered both an intensive civil society exchange and an academic format.

    The conference demonstrated the great public interest in science that engages in dialogue with people on the ground and transfers knowledge. You mentioned this briefly: The issue of migration was a major topic in the campaign for the 2025 federal elections.

  7. How do you see the further political development in Germany?

    My impression is that we are facing a long-term strengthening of the extreme right. The AfD will not disappear anytime soon. Especially in the East, with the exception of Berlin, the party is now the strongest force everywhere. We have also seen massive gains for the AfD in Western Germany. It is the task of society to take a closer look at this. A major shortcoming of the recently concluded coalition negotiations is the lack of issues such as right-wing extremism and the promotion of democracy. In view of the developments we are facing, this cannot really be the case.

    „A major shortcoming of the recently concluded coalition negotiations is the lack of issues such as right-wing extremism and the promotion of democracy.“

    It would be desirable if, after the 2025 federal elections, the parties began to work on policies that would meet the challenges of our time. Internal democratic polarization and mutual hostility should come to an end. Above all, socially and ecologically sustainable future perspectives for Germany and the European Union should be formulated. It is time to create more social security, and not to hide behind a false solution that suggests the world’s problems can be solved by restricting migration. The climate crisis and global power shifts must be addressed democratically. (ugr)

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About the book

The publication explores two central questions: Why are rightwing and far-right movements so successful in times of crisis? And what are the dynamics that make right-wing narratives and attitudes resonate within the so-called center of society? To this end, interviews were conducted in Leipzig and Frankfurt am Main with residents of peripheral districts where the AfD has been strong in recent years. But Daniel Mullis goes beyond a description of the current situation and asks what role individualization and the neoliberalization of society play and how progressive politics can succeed in uncertain times.

Mullis, Daniel (2024): Der Aufstieg der Rechten in Krisenzeiten. Die Regression der Mitte, Regensburg: Reclam. (in German only)

The book was published by Reclam-Verlag and was included in the program of the Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, where it is now out of print. The book was also 3rd place on the non-fiction bestseller lists of Deutsch landfunk Kultur, ZDF and ZEIT for July/August 2024.

Das Projekt

The book was published within the project “Everyday Political Subjectification and the Rise of Regressive Politics. Downward Mobility, Urbanization and the Production of Space in Frankfurt am Main and Leipzig.” The project is funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) since 2021.