Regime Competition – Cold War 2.0?
In the wake of Russia's attack on Ukraine we have seen a great deal of public attention paid to the relationship between different regimes. Much of the debate focuses on a perceived polarization between Western democracies and powerful autocracies, some of which are in conflict or at least in competition with one another. The new PRIF research group, “Regime Competition”, began its work in 2023 and addressed these topics in the PRIF annual conference, a blog series, and various publications.
Assertions that regimes are polarizing as they once did during the Cold War hardly stand up to close analysis. Although regime competition plays a role in many country relations, conflicts, and foreign policy decisions, this role varies in relevance and scope.
Interactions between democracies and autocracies take very different forms, depending on the countries or issues. Moreover, the relationships are not necessarily antagonistic, not to mention those countries whose political regimes cannot be easily assigned to one of the two categories.
In 2023, the PRIF research group “Regime Competition” was established in order to develop a more nuanced understanding of these political dynamics. It aims to challenge the core assumptions behind the notion of competition between different regime types by bringing together and reviewing existing knowledge about the actions and performance of different political regimes. In addition, the group will carry out empirical studies on the political dynamics of regime competition to show how the global order and the foreign and domestic policies of third countries are influenced by variants of (perceived) regime competition. Results on these questions should not only be of academic value, but also provide policy recommendations on how German and European foreign and development policy can and should deal with the increasing diversity of regimes.
Within this framework, panelists discussed how democracies can and should deal with autocracies in the emerging multipolar world. Adopting both empirical and normative perspectives, they questioned the extent to which general norms such as “do no harm” or the orientation of foreign policy towards democratic values are relevant in different forms of interaction, ranging from cooperation and coexistence to competition, distancing, and as far as open conflict. Beyond the practical challenges of “dealing with autocracies”, the conference sought a scientific assessment on how strongly regime types actually play a role in the various interactions. It also argued for a compromise that neither advocates for Cold War-style bloc confrontations nor neglects the relevance of political regimes as a determinant of international politics. It became clear that in order to do justice to the complexity of the various interactions and their effects, a great deal more research is required.
In addition to prominent international academic guests and speakers, the conference was attended by representatives of consulates, international NGOs, among many others from the world of practice. Discussions between practitioners and scholars highlighted the significance of the issues for both communities.
Democracy promotion and the competition between regimes
By definition, the policy field of democracy promotion deals with the nature and transformation of political regimes. The issue of how to deal with autocracies has therefore been central to practice and research in international democracy promotion from the very beginning. However, the growing international role and relevance of autocratic governments, as well as the global trend of democratic backsliding, give these questions new forms and new dimensions.
In the past, the EU and Germany were usually the actors in democracy promotion that were - more or less seriously - committed to promoting democratic change in other countries. This included and still includes the promotion of opposition groups and civil society organizations abroad, in the name of universally understood values such as democracy and human rights. When governments responded with targeted NGO laws to restrict their international funding, this was met with harsh criticism on the German and European side: according to them, the free access of civil society organizations to national and international financial resources is part of the freedom of association guaranteed by human rights.
Yet the tide has turned, and the EU and its member states now see themselves as targets of international influence. In European politics, a lively debate takes hold on how liberal democracies should deal with foreign interference from authoritarian governments such as Russia or China.
Driven by Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election, the British Brexit referendum, the Qatar corruption scandal in the European Parliament and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the European Commission published plans for a “democracy defense package” in February 2023 to protect “European democracy from covert foreign interference”. (kha)
Interview with Jonas Wolff
Prof. Dr Jonas Wolff heads the research department “Intrastate Conflict”, is a Board Member at PRIF and Professor of Political Science at Goethe University Frankfurt. He has been working on international democracy promotion for many years.
Is the EU becoming illiberal, or does it have to become illiberal in order to ward off interference and influence from outside? Will its liberal legislation and its liberality eventually lead to its own undoing?
I would definitely not put it in such sweeping terms. Aside from the fact that there are growing forces within the EU that are pursuing an agenda that can be described as illiberal, even the German idea of a “defensive democracy” ultimately implies that liberal democracies do and must sometimes resort to illiberal means – such as banning parties – in order to protect themselves from their enemies. A very similar discussion is currently taking place at EU level with regard to the issue of “foreign interference” by autocratic governments such as Russia or China. There exists an obvious conflict of objectives: if we systematically monitor forms of financial support for civil society actors or media bodies in the EU, for example, in order to prevent what is termed “malicious” or “malign” foreign influence, we must ultimately look at all forms of financial support. Otherwise, it will not be possible to identify attempts that are directed against the foundations of democracy. Not only does this expose all externally funded organizations to initial suspicion, in fact it establishes general controls and thus potential restrictions on civil society funding. A second conflict of objectives that is all too rarely discussed at the EU level concerns the contradiction between an EU seeking to defend itself against “foreign influence” with controls, transparency regulations and restrictions, and the same union that, in its foreign and development policy, claims the right to support local civil society actors in other states as it pleases, even bypassing governments.
Do liberal democracies have to adapt in order to fend off threats? And might such a blurring between liberal and illiberal practices not be dangerous?
My general answer would be that liberal democracies do not and probably cannot exist in a pure or ideal form. Liberal democracy is just an overly contradictory entity, especially in capitalist societies and a globalized world economy. In this respect, all political systems that we describe as liberal-democratic also have illiberal, authoritarian or at least non-democratic elements. We may deplore this, but it is important to recognize it first. More specifically, it is probably the case that the liberal democracies that actually exist in our part of the world are currently exposed to new or at least intensifying threats from within and without. Appropriate responses to these threats are currently being negotiated on a socio-political level, bringing together different ideas of democracy and freedom as well as divergent perceptions of threats. What seems important to me in this context would be, first of all, that any potentially illiberal response to threats to liberal democracy is systematically examined in advance for its human rights implications, for example, and generally for its necessity, targeting and appropriateness. Secondly, there is, in my opinion, a well-founded demand that such measures should be limited in time and be subject to conscientious, independent evaluation. Thirdly, especially under the current global political conditions, it is crucial not to create any new double standards here. For the example under discussion, this would mean that the EU should only adopt regulations against “foreign interference” that it would also welcome and support in other countries.
How did this shift in perception come about? Has the world changed so much?
The world has obviously changed – and continues to change. Just a few years ago, “foreign interference” was almost exclusively an accusation made by non-Western countries. Usually, this was directed against Western states and their claim to promote democracy, human rights and civil society in other countries. Under these extremely asymmetrical conditions, Western governments were able to argue, for example, that the unrestricted access of civil society organizations to financial resources from abroad was a core component of the internationally recognized freedom of assembly. Today, the EU clearly sees things differently. If the problem is taken seriously, then it is a matter of renegotiating national and international norms that enable a still not simply symmetrical, but nevertheless reciprocal practice of interference to a reasonable extent – containing it appropriately at the same time.
Read More
Harth, Lukas/Kriener, Florian/Wolff, Jonas: The EU Response to Foreign Interference, in: Heidelberg Journal of International Law (HJIL)/Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (ZaöRV), 83(2), 197–207, 2023. DOI: 10.17104/0044-2348-2023-2-1.
Research Group Regime Competition
The research group is coordinated by Dr Irene Weipert-Fenner and Dr Pascal Abb. It consists of a total of eleven researchers from various PRIF research departments.