A Climate of War?

In September 2025, the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research announced that with ocean acidification, the seventh out of nine planetary boundaries—which make the Earth a safe habitat for humans—has now been breached. This is our own fault: “Humans have always damaged their environment, but never so quickly, on this planetary scale, and never with such far-reaching consequences for the entire Earth system”, is how PRIF researcher Patrick Flamm explains the extent of the impact humanity has had on the planet since industrialization, and latest since the 1950s. For this reason, Paul Crutzen, Nobel Prize laureate and former director at the Max Planck Institute for Chemistry in Mainz, proclaimed the Age of Man in 2000—the Anthropocene. What does this mean for issues of peace and conflict? How do the escalating ecological crises affect violence, migration, and security? Violent conflicts and ecological crises are mutually reinforcing. On the one hand, war always means (environmental) destruction. For instance, it is estimated today that during the Vietnam War, approximately 3.1 million hectares of mangrove and rainforest were destroyed—devastating, not only in terms of the CO2 emissions released, but also for ecosystems and biodiversity. In addition, military operations contribute to the problem through their high energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions—for example, through the use of aircraft, ships, and tanks, as well as the production and deployment of weapons and ammunition. Indeed, reconstructing destroyed regions after a war typically causes even more emissions than the fighting itself. Furthermore, the ongoing ecological crises also influence why, by what means, and under what conditions wars are waged—and how they might impact those affected.

Research on Ecology, Climate, and Conflict

Headed by Patrick Flamm, researchers from three Research Departments have been working together since March 2025 to investigate these connections. The Research Group Ecology, Climate, and Conflict examines under what conditions the three major ecological crises of our time contribute to conflict, under what conditions they can be avoided, or whether they might serve as starting points for cooperation. In addition, in December 2025, Tobias Ide, who has received multiple awards for his research on the climate-conflict nexus, took over as head of Research Department Transnational Politics. He strengthens the Research Group Ecology, Climate, and Conflict with his expertise as deputy director.

The “Environment-Security Nexus”: Climate and Ecology in Conflict

One focus of the research group is the classic “environment-security nexus”. Here, the central question is how the climate, biodiversity, and pollution crises impact specific conflicts and wars. While the environment has long been viewed as the passive “stage” on which conflicts are taking place, Patrick Flamm explains that, “[t]oday it is clear that this stage is not so stable after all and that it is built on shaky ground.” These changing environmental conditions also have an impact on conflicts.

Ecological Crises as Risk Factors

This is particularly evident in the case of the climate crisis. Extreme weather events are becoming more frequent, and resources and land are becoming increasingly scarce. In this regard, Tobias Ide notes, it would be “absolutely naive to assume that something with such far-reaching ecological and societal consequences as global environmental change is not relevant to peace and conflict research.” By exacerbating the causes of conflict, climate change can thus increase the risk of violent conflicts. These primarily involve riots, protests, or violence within communities—but in a few cases also civil wars. Whether consequences of climate change lead to conflicts, however, depends primarily on the local context and how politics and society respond. For instance, climate-related disasters increase the risk of conflict particularly in countries characterized by the marginalization of ethnic groups, a low level of economic development, and a high dependence on agriculture. Here, extreme weather events can lead to dissatisfaction with disaster management or to a state vacuum, which in turn can be exploited by rebel groups. Climate change should therefore not be understood as a primary driver of conflict. Rather, it increases the risk of conflict when certain political and economic contextual factors are present. As Tobias Ide explains: “At their core, conflicts remain political, and, to a lesser extent, economic. Climate change can serve as a trigger or exacerbate certain economic factors—such as economic turmoil or state weakness—which in turn lead to political discontent. But it is just one contributing factor among many others.”

Peacebuilding through Ecological Crises?

Likewise, the phenomenon of environmental peacebuilding illustrates that the symptoms of ecological crises do not necessarily lead to more violent conflicts. The term describes cases in which ecological crises or scarce resources strengthen cooperation between states or social groups, build lasting trust—and can even lead to peace. According to findings in disaster sociology, social cohesion and cooperation within communities tend to grow following major storms or floods. The fact that differences are also temporarily set aside between groups in the face of shared challenges is evident, for example, in East Africa. Here, pastoralists—nomadic herders—band together during droughts to share grazing lands or water sources.

Environmental Protection as a Cause of Conflict: Socio-Ecological Transformation Conflicts

Not only the consequences of climate change but also measures to mitigate it can be the subject of social conflicts. For example, when the (feared) costs of climate protection measures are perceived as disproportionate or unfairly distributed. A well-known example of such socio-ecological transformation conflicts is the Yellow Vests movement in France, which began in 2018 as a protest movement against increased taxes on fossil fuels. Moreover, the extraction of critical raw materials such as lithium—mostly in countries of the Global South—for the expansion of “green technologies” in the Global North is also frequently accompanied by conflicts over land use or the persecution of environmental activists.

Geopolitics of the Anthropocene

The group’s other research focus extends beyond local environmental conditions in armed conflicts. The focus here is not on individual conflicts, but on environmental and sustainability policy on a global scale. After all, the ecological crises of our time do not stop at national borders. Similarly, in the Anthropocene era, where human activity affects the entire planet, traditional, state-centered concepts of geopolitics are reaching their limits. This is particularly evident in regions such as the polar regions, the Amazon rainforest, or even the world’s oceans and Earth’s orbit. On the one hand, these regions are of global significance. Changes in them can have irreversible effects on the entire Earth system if certain critical thresholds—planetary tipping points—are reached. And second, they are often global commons that are not under the control of individual states. For this reason, the research group examines, from a “planetary perspective,” the dynamics of cooperation and conflict that arise from the political management of these regions. Their research focuses both on the management of planetary tipping points and global technological developments. Aimed at counteracting global warming, these methods involve deliberate, large-scale technical interventions in the climate system—such as processes that actively remove CO2 from the atmosphere or those that modify solar radiation. While these technologies are being considered as potential solutions to ecological problems, they simultaneously create new regulatory challenges for policymakers. In this context, potential conflicts arise and questions of justice emerge—such as who actually benefits from the development and deployment of new technologies, or what the dominant proposed solutions to combat space debris mean for our ecosystems and atmosphere.

Four Questions for... Tobias Ide

Tobias Ide

Prof. Dr. Tobias Ide is head of Research Department Transnational Politics at PRIF. He is also Chair of Peace and Conflict Research: Transnational Actors at TU Darmstadt and deputy head of the Research Group Ecology, Climate, and Conflict at PRIF. Most recently, he served as an associate professor of political science and international relations at Murdoch University in Perth, Australia, and as an associate professor of peace and sustainability at Hiroshima University, Japan.

1. Do you currently view politics with concern or optimism when it comes to combating climate change and adapting to its consequences?

   My answer depends on which level you’re looking at. One thing is clear: policymakers aren’t doing enough to prevent climate change. This will become a very major problem in 10, 15, 20 years and beyond, because it could actually still be addressed at relatively low cost right now. However, it is an increasingly contentious issue within societies. And internationally, of course, we are currently facing very difficult conditions with all these upheavals and the current U.S. administration’s absolute unwillingness to engage. Therefore, I am very pessimistic about climate change mitigation for at least the next 10 years—and that is, unfortunately, a very critical timeframe.

   The next step would be: What are we actually doing to adapt to the consequences of climate change? And I think this picture is relatively mixed. Of course, climate change adaptation is currently suffering from other issues being prioritized: USAID has been cut in the U.S., in Germany, less money is now flowing into development cooperation and more money into the military sector. Moreover, the international community is already falling far short of its commitments to contribute to international climate adaptation funds. And when it does contribute, it tends to support countries or projects where there is a geopolitical interest, rather than where climate change has the worst impacts. I think, however, that there are also positive developments. Germany, in particular, has made significant progress in recent years on issues such as urban planning and developing disaster response plans for heatwaves and floods. There is a much clearer awareness of these issues and a much greater willingness to invest resources. In particular, the security implications of climate change were long considered a marginal issue. This is now included in Germany’s national security strategy and has been strongly emphasized by many countries on the UN Security Council. Even countries that were initially rather hesitant—such as Australia, Japan, or Canada—are now really getting heavily involved.

2. What does that mean for your own role as a researcher? Where would you position yourself on the spectrum from research to activism?

   I’m not sure if I want to take such an active stance on that: As a researcher, I would first and foremost say that it is my job to derive recommendations from data and scientifically validated findings. I don’t really see myself in a strongly activist role. My task is more to generate knowledge and make it available in a form that political actors—from NGOs and civil society to governments—can use. I believe this also stems from the principle of scientific neutrality. Nevertheless, it would be naive to assume that what I do has no political implications. And of course, based on the data, I say: Climate change is a massive problem for human security, but also for national security. Germany, as well as many other states and actors, would be well advised to address this proactively.

“As peace and conflict researchers, we need to engage much more actively in these debates on climate protection and climate adaptation, because they often touch very concretely on issues of peace and conflict.”