Security, Science, Responsibility

The Russia-Ukraine war, Trump’s second term, and a return to (great) power politics: What new role does this turning point in security politics require of German research institutions? Civil clauses—voluntary commitments by universities to use their research and teaching exclusively for civilian and/or peaceful purposes—have been a major focus of political debate. Yet civil clauses can be structured in very different ways and generally do not rule out cooperation with the Bundeswehr or the defense industry entirely. Approximately 70 German universities have such civil clauses—that means roughly one in six institutions of higher education. In 2024, Bavaria became the first federal state to pass a controversial law banning civil clauses. Since then, there has been a nationwide debate over whether civil clauses are still appropriate.

However, the heated debate over civil clauses misses the real issues in security research, as Christopher Daase noted in his opening remarks at the conference “Security, Science, and Responsibility—Research in Times of Conflict and Crisis”. The conference, which took place in Darmstadt in December 2025, is part of the project “Dialogue Forum: Security Research and Civil Clauses”. As part of this initiative, PRIF is organizing a multi-stage, inclusive dialogue process in Hesse on issues related to security-relevant research, research security, and the future of civil clauses. The process connects the leadership of Hesse’s universities, the Hessian academic community, and policymakers. As a non-university research institute at the intersection of peace and security research, PRIF is implementing the initiative of the Hessian Ministry of Science and Research, Art, and Culture (HMWK) to promote a strategic dialogue on security research in Hesse.

According to Christopher Daase, the truly important question is how research and science can contribute to protecting the liberal democratic order while simultaneously being protected from certain risks. The latter aspect is summarized under the term “research security”. This involves protecting scientific work from espionage, unwanted leakage of knowledge or technology, or its use for purposes that contradict shared values. Research is thus understood here as an asset worthy of protection, but also as a geopolitical resource. How exactly research security should be defined is subject of academic and political debate.

Another related but not entirely identical topic is the handling of security-relevant research. The Joint Committee on the Handling of Security-Relevant Research of the DFG and Leopoldina defines this as follows: “Security-relevant research includes scientific work that has the potential to produce knowledge, products or technologies that can be misused (by third parties) to harm human dignity, life, health, freedom, property, the environment or peaceful coexistence. This is designated as “of concern” if the misuse can be immediate and the potential damage is significant.”

Biology offers a famous and illustrative example of security-relevant research. For the purpose of pandemic prevention, research is conducted to determine the conditions under which pathogens can become dangerous to humans or particularly contagious. This sometimes involves experiments that cause pathogens to acquire these dangerous properties in the first place—so-called gain-of-function research. On the one hand, such experiments help us to better understand pathogens and prepare for new outbreaks. On the other hand, they also carry the risk that the modified pathogens could unintentionally be released into the environment or that the knowledge gained could be misused to produce biological weapons. These are therefore particularly sensitive areas of research because they could—intentionally or unintentionally—lead to catastrophic consequences.

The debate over the responsibility of research after the “Zeitenwende” thus brings together various questions: what contribution can research and science make to security, defense, and resilience? How can and should security-related research be handled in the future? And when it actually comes to conducting research for military purposes, are universities even the appropriate place? Or do the heightened requirements for research security, particularly in strategically relevant areas, suggest that such research should take place in closed and specially protected locations, away from universities—which are conventionally spaces of open exchange?

When discussing civil clauses as a policy instrument, it is also important to understand the regulatory impact these voluntary commitments can actually have. They do not establish a general ban on security research, as Nicole Deitelhoff emphasized in an interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Rather, civil clauses are about ensuring that science commits to protecting the liberal democratic order. In any case, civil clauses cannot restrict the constitutionally enshrined right to academic freedom—just as politics cannot oblige universities to cooperate with the military or the arms and defense industry.

Above all, civil clauses can serve as instruments of scientific self-regulation to encourage reflection on the potential consequences and risks of research. Since strengthening research security must not come at the expense of academic freedom, the scientific community’s awareness of its responsibility is of particular importance. The implementation procedures and advisory structures often associated with civil clauses—such as ethics committees—can provide researchers with guidance and raise awareness about the responsible handling of security-relevant research. Such ethics committees are also recommended, for example, by the Joint Committee on the Handling of Security-Relevant Research of the DFG and Leopoldina.

These and other issues formed the scope of the discussion held in Darmstadt in December. Alongside more than 70 representatives from various Hessian universities, Timon Gremmels, Hessian Minister of State for Science and Research, Art, and Culture, was also present. Discussions took place during a panel session and in several working groups. Finally, the key discussion points and findings were compiled and reflected upon—particularly with a view to potential impulses the conference should provide for further debate in Hesse.

However, the exchange is not over. In the next step, the contributions and reflections presented are to be incorporated into a joint anthology. Beyond that, it remains the task of universities and non-university research institutions to continue the dialogue on the challenges and responsibilities of research in times of conflict and crisis. (ewa)